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Abstract: During the 2007 Ontario referendum on electoral reform, Elections Ontario took the 
unprecedented step of hiring local referendum resource officers (RRO) to provide referendum 
information through presentations and public meetings in all ridings. This article examines the 
feedback of nearly one-third of these RROs collected through telephone and email interviews. It 
seeks to understand the challenges faced by RROs and present a number of lessons learned from 
their experiences. Many of the RROs interviewed commented that their work was not supported 
by appropriate timelines, budgets and materials. In addition, many were displeased with the 
restrictions placed on RROs in efforts to keep the Elections Ontario campaign neutral, ultimately 
limiting of the ability of their audiences to form opinions on the referendum issue. This case 
study supports previous referendum education and voting research that demonstrates that 
referendum education campaigns should not only provide timely and accessible information, but 
also encourage debate in order to provide citizens with the competence needed to form opinions. 
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Résumé: Lors du référendum ontarien de 2007 sur la réforme électorale, Élections Ontario prit 
la décision sans précédent d'engager des agents locaux d'information sur le référendum, ou 
Referendum Resource Officers (RRO) chargés d'informer le public sur cette consultation par le 
biais de présentations et d'assemblées dans chaque circonscription. Cet article étudie les réactions 
de près d'un tiers de ces agents, colligées lors d'entrevues téléphoniques ou par courriel. Il vise à 
comprendre les défis auxquels firent face les RRO et présente nombre de leçons tirées de leur 
expérience. Plusieurs des RRO interviewés estiment que leur travail n'a pas été soutenu par des 
échéanciers, un budget et un matériel appropriés. De plus, plusieurs sont mécontents des 
restrictions qui leur furent imposées dans le but de garantir la neutralité de la campagne, qui 
limitèrent la capacité des publics rencontrés à se former une opinion sur l'enjeu du référendum. 
Cette étude de cas conforte les résultats d'études antérieures sur la formation et le vote lors de 
référendums, qui démontrent que les campagnes d'éducation référendaires doivent non seulement 
livrer une information pertinente et aisément accessible, mais aussi encourager le débat dans le 
but de donner aux citoyens la compétence requise à former une opinion. 
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, 2007, Ontarians 
were provided the unique opportunity to 
vote on a proposed change to their electoral 
system in a province-wide referendum. If 
passed, the province’s current system of 
First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) would be 
replaced with a new Mixed-Member 
Proportional (MMP) system, as proposed by 
a provincial Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral 
Reform (2007). However, the referendum 
failed to pass the threshold of at least 60% 
support province-wide, and 50% support in 
60% of the ridings. Only 36.9% of Ontarians 
voted for the MMP system, and it earned 
majority support in only five ridings 
(Elections Ontario, 2007d: ii). Although in 
some surveys a large majority of electors 
self-reported that they knew about the 
proposed changes, many commentators and 
academics blamed the failure of MMP on 
the quality of the education campaign.
 1 
Two 
weeks after the referendum, political 
scientists Cutler and Fournier wrote in the 
Globe and Mail that although citizens said 
they knew about the referendum, “useful 
knowledge about the proposal was rare” 
(2007).  
The responsibility of providing 
referendum information to the public fell to 
Ontario’s non-partisan election management 
body. Elections Ontario was instructed by 
the government to “ensure that electors 
throughout Ontario receive clear and 
impartial information... about the 
referendum” (Ontario Legislature, 2007) and 
therefore launched a Provincial Referendum 
Education Program (PREP), comprised of 
advertisements, an information hotline, a 
website, and public outreach activities. This 
public outreach element also contained a 
unique program of grassroots education 
through local liaison officers.  Elections 
Ontario chose to hire one Referendum 
Resource Officer (RRO) for each electoral 
district, who was tasked with providing 
referendum information through 
presentations and public meetings in their 
communities.
 
It was the first time an 
elections administration agency had decided 
to reach out to every electoral district 
through a local information officer.   
This paper examines the feedback of 
nearly one-third of these RROs collected 
through telephone and email interviews. It 
seeks to understand the challenges faced by 
RROs and their perspectives of the 
referendum education campaign in the 
ridings. It furthermore seeks to present a 
number of lessons learned from these 
experiences. Many of the RROs interviewed 
felt that the referendum education program 
fell short of its aim to provide local 
education on the referendum question. They 
commented that their work was not 
supported by appropriate timelines, budgets 
and materials. In addition, many were 
displeased with the restrictions placed on 
RROs in efforts to keep the Elections 
Ontario campaign neutral. This ultimately 
limited the ability of RROs to provide the 
information that would allow their audiences 
to form opinions on the referendum issue, 
rather than simply know that a referendum 
would be taking place. This case study 
supports previous referendum education and 
voting research that demonstrates that 
referendum education campaigns should not 
only provide timely and accessible 
information, but also encourage debate in 
order to provide citizens with the 
competence needed to make their “big 
decision” (Elections Ontario, 2008: 12).  
 
Voter Competence in Referendums 
 
The first academic analysis to follow 
Ontario’s referendum on electoral reform 
was the aforementioned Globe and Mail 
article. Using survey data collected during 
the referendum campaign, Culter and 
Fournier sought to uncover why the 
referendum did not pass (2007). One major 





observation they make is that the public was 
not dissatisfied with the FPTP system to 
begin with, making the weak response to 
electoral reform unsurprising. Additionally, 
they found that the public was not well 
informed about the electoral reform 
proposal. Although two-thirds of the public 
knew a referendum on electoral reform was 
taking place, less than half knew important 
details about the proposed MMP system. 
Stephenson and Tanguay agree that concerns 
for the quality of provincial democracy was 
never a salient issue for voters and that 
voters were not sufficiently informed about 
the referendum (2009). Similar evidence led 
LeDuc, Bastedo and Baquero (2008) to call 
the 2007 referendum on electoral reform a 
“quiet referendum,” in which the public 
remained largely uninformed and unengaged 
throughout the province-wide electoral 
reform debate.  
It is, in fact, a common problem 
during referendums that citizens lack the 
knowledge to make good decisions, 
especially since referendums can touch on 
unfamiliar issues and may not clearly divide 
the populace along party lines (LeDuc, 
2003: 43, 174).
2 
Therefore, electors must 
rely even more on the information gleaned 
from the referendum campaign when 
making their decisions. However, it is also 
common that many voters, for lack of time, 
interest or political sophistication, will not 
be able to condense a great amount of 
information into a logical vote choice. This 
is particularly difficult for a referendum on 
something as technical as electoral reform. 
In The Reasoning Voter, Popkin explains 
that voters do not act like statisticians, who 
can easily and logically process the political 
information they receive and calculate a vote 
(1991). Instead, voters will look for cues or 
shortcuts in order to make their decision at 
the polls. These cues can be as simple as 
consideration of their party identification, or 
how the vote will affect their social group or 
livelihood.  However, during referendum 
campaigns, those shortcuts are not 
necessarily as apparent, especially if 
political parties have not taken clear 
positions on the issue, or if interest groups 
themselves are unsure of where they stand 
on the referendum question. Voters are also 
unable to take other traditional cues, such as 
perceptions of candidates’ characteristics, 
during referendums where there may not be 
a clear spokesperson for each side of the 
debate. Referendums on electoral reform 
will often have the additional problem of 
being on an issue that most voters do not 
consider on a daily basis, or will not greatly 
affect their daily life. Indeed, voters may not 
have even considered electoral systems 
change before the referendum.  
Therefore, the education campaigns 
by election management bodies or 
government-appointed panels become so 
crucial for referendums regarding electoral 
reform. Public education campaigns need to 
focus on providing the voter with 
“competence” rather than just the 
encyclopaedic information that Popkin’s 
unrealistic statistician voter would use. As 
Lupia and Johnston write, “competence is 
the ability to make accurate predictions; 
information is data” (2001: 195). In order to 
make choices, voters do not need to know 
every detail about the intricacies of the 
policy proposal. However, they do need 
appropriate information to take the right 
shortcuts, as they would do in any election 
campaign (Lupia and Johnston, 2001: 196). 
Referendums can provide a unique 
opportunity for citizens to engage in policy 
decisions, but only if citizens are equipped 
with the competence to make good decisions 
(Lupia and Johnston, 2001: 207-8; de Vreese 
and Semetko, 2004: 7).
 
 
Moreover, the quality of an 
education campaign during a referendum 
can have an impact on the outcome of the 
vote.  As Johnston et al. explain regarding 





Canada’s 1992 constitutional referendum, 
well-informed voters were more likely to 
support the Charlottetown Accord. Even 
those who were pre-disposed against the 
Accord were more likely to become 
supporters as they learned more about it 
(Johnston et al., 1996: 249). There exists a 
danger that an “information barrier,” or lack 
of public awareness, can skew the results 
towards the status quo (LeDuc, 2011: 552). 
LeDuc explains that “the NO side frequently 
possesses a considerable advantage, and 
negative campaign tactics are often 
effective, particularly in the media. YES 
campaigners on the other hand need to 
‘educate’ as well as persuade an often 
sceptical and poorly informed public to 
support change” (2011: 552). This idea that 
the NO side will have an advantage when 
the public is poorly informed is supported 
by a study conducted by Stephenson and 
Tanguay on the 2007 Ontario Referendum 
on Electoral Reform (2009: 19). Their 
survey found that those who knew more 
about the referendum proposal were more 
likely to vote for reform.
3
 Again, they 
demonstrate that an “information deficit” 
can skew results in favour of the status quo. 
Therefore, a better understanding of various 
referendum public information strategies, as 
well as the challenges that election 
administrators face, can also help us 
understand the results of referendums.  
 
Examples of Referendum Education 
Campaigns  
 
Public education campaigns are 
therefore key to understanding the 
referendum on MMP in Ontario. Ontario had 
the experiences of many prior referendum 
education campaigns to draw on when 
designing their education campaign. New 
Zealand’s successful 1993 referendum on a 
mixed-member proportional system featured 
a five million dollar campaign, run by an 
independent Chief Ombudsman. It included 
brochures sent to every household (as well 
as a more detailed guide available to all 
voters), seminars and three television 
programs about the referendum (Seyd, 
1998). In addition, the campaign allocated 
resources to reach Maori voters (Vowles, 
1995: 109). Nevertheless, it was criticized 
for only raising awareness that the 
referendum would take place and for 
providing vague information on key issues 
for the population, such as how the party 
lists would be decided and how coalition 
government might work (Temple, 1995: 
235; Vowles, 1995: 109). In addition to this 
public information campaign, however, the 
referendum campaign featured lively 
discussions between political leaders and 
interest groups. The issue polarized New 
Zealand’s political elites, pitting a National 
Party-backed Campaign for Better 
Government (against MMP) against a 
Labour party-backed Electoral Reform 
Coalition (for MMP) (Temple, 1995: 236). 
Without spending caps, the groups initiated 
a fierce debate on electoral system change, 
though the campaign against MMP spent 
about ten times that of the more grassroots 
campaign for electoral reform (Temple, 
1995: 236). Nevertheless, the referendum 
passed by 53.9% and New Zealand adopted 
a system of MMP (Temple, 1995: 237). 
Shortly thereafter, discussions began 
regarding a change to Canada’s electoral 
system.
4
 British Columbia was the first 
province to initiate a provincial referendum 
on electoral reform in 2005, after an 
innovative Citizens’ Assembly proposed a 
new system of single transferable vote (BC-
STV).
5
 Like New Zealand’s campaign, 
Elections BC’s education program included 
a media advertising campaign, an 
information hotline, a website and a 
brochure mailed to each household 
(Elections BC, 2005). Furthermore, four 
province-wide liaison officers were hired to 





target Aboriginal populations, Indo-
Canadians, Chinese-Canadians and youth. 
The campaign focused on raising awareness 
that a referendum would take place, and was 
criticized for failing to generate public 
enthusiasm for the question of electoral 
reform. While interest groups opposed to 
and advocating for BC-STV did attempt to 
spark debate among some voters, the 
campaigns failed to gain much attention 
from the general public or the media (Pilon, 
2010: 78). The final vote was extremely 
close to passing (57.69% for BC -STV, 
42.31% against), but did not meet the 60% 
threshold that had been required by the 
government for the referendum to pass 
(Barnes and Robertson, 2009). With such a 
close result, a second referendum was held 
in 2009. This time, the education campaign 
included $500 000 funding for coalitions of 
interest groups on both the ‘yes’ (British 
Columbians for BC-STV) and ‘no’ (No 
STV) sides of the debate. However, the 
public was less interested in electoral system 
change than they had been only 5 years 
earlier, with only 39.09% of electors in 
favour of the proposal (Elections BC, 
2009b). 
The first province to bring forward a 
mixed-member proportional system to the 
Canadian citizenry through a referendum 
was Prince Edward Island in November of 
2005 (Carruthers and Gallant).  The 
education campaign was headed by the 
Commission on PEI's Electoral Future, 
consisting of eight commissioners from PEI 
who were instructed by the provincial 
government to analyse electoral reform 
commissioner Normal H. Carruthers’ MMP 
recommendation and launch a public 
education program in advance of the 
referendum (Russell and Weeks, 2005: 3). 
This was to be done in only 8 months, and 
the commissioners initially requested more 
time to fully prepare their MMP proposal 
and better educate the public (Lea, 2006). 
The government nevertheless kept the 
referendum date set at November 28, 2005. 
The public education campaign consisted of 
public meetings, media ads, a brochure 
mailed to each household and a plebiscite 
website. With weak interest groups, the 
editorial section of the daily provincial 
newspaper became the most common forum 
for discussion about the plebiscite.
6
 The 
referendum received very little support, with 




When Ontario’s referendum on 
electoral reform was announced, the Chief 
Electoral Officer was instructed to “conduct 
a program of public education, to ensure that 
electors throughout Ontario receive clear 
and impartial information about,  (a)  the 
referendum process, the date of the 
referendum and the referendum question; 
and  (b)  the content of the choices in the 
referendum” (Ontario Legislature, 2007a). 
In consultation with their counterparts in 
British Columbia and New Zealand, 
academics, public relations professionals 
and electors, Elections Ontario decided on a 
multi-pronged approach to their referendum 
education campaign. Called PREP 
(Provincial Referendum Education Project), 
the neutral informational campaign focused 
on the slogans “Understand the question” 
and “It’s a big decision” (Election Ontario, 
2008: 12). The campaign aimed at raising 
awareness that a referendum on electoral 
reform would be taking place in Ontario and 
directing electors to other Elections Ontario 
destinations for more information. The 
entire program was budgeted to cost $6 825 
000, however the final total of expenditures 
was $7 895 000 (Elections Ontario, 2008: 
32, 39). The PREP program included a 
series of three information pieces distributed 
by mail. Two were householders sent 
directly to electors, while the third was 
inserted into the Notice of Registration Card 
that each elector received prior to the 





election (Elections Ontario, 2008: 15-7).
 
Additionally, there included advertising on 
television, radio and print, which consumed 
nearly half the total budget of referendum 
expenditures (Elections Ontario, 2008: 13-
6)
7
 and an internet strategy, that included a 
website, interactive video and internet 
advertising (Elections Ontario, 2008, 18-20).  
Elections Ontario also added one 
unique aspect to their Referendum campaign 
strategy: the hiring of Referendum Resource 
Officers to perform community outreach. 
The program, costing $580 000, was aimed 
at bringing the education campaign to local 
communities through “face-to-face contact 
and information sharing” (Elections Ontario, 
2008: 22, 24). One RRO was hired in each 
electoral district.
8
 The program was 
designed to give Elections Ontario’s 
referendum campaign a physical and 
personal presence in each riding “to ensure 
their information reached electors in 
communities throughout the province” 
(Elections Ontario, 2008: 22). Elections 
Ontario instructed RROs to “contact local 
service groups and community interest 
groups; Raise awareness of the referendum 
and the referendum question; Direct 
individuals to the resources available to 
learn more; [and] Maintain a neutral position 
in all of their communications” (2008: 22). 
In doing so, the RRO program would 
produce a more localized referendum 
campaign with the aim of better educating 
the public. Since RROs were hired locally, 
they would be better able to reach 
communities groups that an outside liaison 
officer may not consider contacting. They 
would also have the local knowledge to 
know where and when to reach the greatest 
number and variety of individuals. 
Furthermore, the program would provide 
communities with an individual they could 
turn to for more information about the 
referendum question.  After the referendum, 
Elections Ontario explained that “for many 
electors, the ability to associate a face with 
the referendum message proved to be a 





In order to better understand the 
RRO program and approaches to voter 
education in referendums, I conducted 
interviews with 30 RROs in June, 2011. 
Elections Ontario offered to facilitate 
contact with RROs, however this proved not 
to be necessary, as many of the RROs names 
and contact information were available 
online from their activities as RROs. 
Additionally, some RROs were able to put 
me in touch with their colleagues. Attempts 
were made to contact all 106 RROs. 
However, when a goal of interviews with 30 
RROs was reached, additional RROs were 
not contacted due to time constraints. The 
RROs interviewed were diverse, from both 
urban and rural communities, Northern and 
Southern Ontario, and from a variety of 
professions and ages. Many of the RROs 
interviewed were retired from professions 
such as teaching, business and publishing.  
Some were recent university graduates, 
while others worked in consulting or 
community activism. The most prevalent 
profession among the RROs interviewed 
was education, as one third identified 
themselves as former educators.  RROs 
ranged in age from 22 to 74 (Elections 
Ontario, 2008: 22).
9
 A full list of RROs 
interviewed, including the name and riding 
of RROs who chose not to remain 
anonymous, is available in Appendix 1.  
Interviews were conducted by email 
and telephone. Email interviews were 
structured. Each RRO was provided a list of 
questions covering RROs’ experiences from 
their initial inquiry into the position to their 
post-election reflections, to which they 
responded in writing. Telephone interviews 





were semi-structured, lasted between ten 
minutes and one hour, and were conducted 
by the author. The same list of questions 
used for email interviews were followed as a 
guideline, but the interviewer asked some 
follow-up questions to responses and 
allowed RROs to provide additional 
opinions and information. Some RROs 
voluntarily sent follow-up emails with 
copies of materials they used and reports 
they produced. Ethics approval was granted 
to allow the researcher digital recording of 
the telephone interviews for the purpose of 
the research project, to be destroyed after a 
period of 5 years. The feedback of RROs 
was the focus, rather than testing a specific 
hypothesis. Interview data was coded by 
hand to identify certain themes in the 
interviews, but was not processed 
quantitatively. While interviewing RROS, it 
became clear that several important 
challenges were commonly faced by RROs 
of different backgrounds and regions. Their 
input echoes some of the problems that arose 
with both the localized and province-wide 
referendum education campaign. 
 
Campaign Timeframe   
 
Before the referendum was even a 
certainty, Elections Ontario knew they 
would be constrained by a short timeframe 
to conduct their education campaign. In their 
final report on the 2007 Referendum on 
Electoral Reform, Elections Ontario calls the 
education campaign a 168-day journey, that 
began with the First Reading of Bill 218, the 
Election Statue Law Amendment Act of 
2007, and ended on the October 10
th
 
Election and Referendum Day. Throughout 
the report, Elections Ontario emphasizes 
their tight timelines for conducting an 
education campaign. Elections Ontario 
officials noted that the inspiration for their 
education campaign came from the 
successful New Zealand case, but were 
unable to replicate it in Ontario. “One key 
difference,” the report notes, “... was the 
approximate two-year preparation period in 
New Zealand compared with the 168 days 
available in Ontario” (Elections Ontario, 
2008: 6).  
This limited timeframe also affected 
the RROs, whose employment period lasted 
less than two months. When asked what 
changes they would make to the RRO 
program, 22 of the 30 RROs interviewed 
expressed frustration that the short timeline 
limited their ability to perform their 
education duties.
10
 One RRO mentioned 
“...to believe that you could educate a 
population in a month and half on issues that 
most of them had never even considered 
before was naive.”11 Another explained that 
voters similarly were not given “enough 
time to fully understand the issue,” and, 
more importantly, there was no time “to 
enter into discussions with others about it.”12 
Thus, even if voters were able to learn about 
the technical aspects of the referendum 
during the campaign, they had little time to 
form opinions on the subject. For some 
RROs, this proved to be a “major bone of 
contention with many people in the 
audiences.”13 When asked how long the 
ideal campaign would be, RROs suggested 
that the education campaign could have 
lasted at least 6 months prior to the vote, in 




More specifically, many RROs 
mentioned that lead-time restrictions limited 
the possible presentation venues. Charged 
with making presentations about the 
referendum at places such as community 
group meetings, seniors’ residences, places 
of worship and community festivals,
15
 RROs 
found that when they began calling groups 
to book presentations at the end of August, 
the groups’ schedules for September and 
October were often already filled. One RRO 
recalls, “The larger places... like the service 





clubs... they’ll book their speakers months in 
advance, although they said... if we’d had 
notice....”16 Thus, the short lead-time was 
not consistent with the stated aims of the 
RRO program to visit a large number of 
community groups.  
Governments and election 
administrators therefore need the foresight to 
begin the education campaign months before 
the referendum date, both through the 
promotion of media awareness and by 
allowing local representatives to begin 
speaking about the referendum to their 
communities much earlier. Elections Ontario 
emphasized in their final report that they 
were simply given too little time. 
Considering their education mandate was 
announced less than six months prior to the 
referendum date, the burden of timing was 
not the responsibility of Elections Ontario. 
Instead, as one RRO explains, “Education 
should have started much before it did.  I 
viewed this as a lack of political will to 
actually see democracy work fairly.”17  
Knowing from RRO feedback that education 
campaigns must begin many months in 
advance of the referendum date, 
governments serious about giving electoral 
reform a fair hearing should start the 
electoral reform process well in advance of a 
proposed referendum date.  
 
Timing with a Provincial Election  
 
Not only was Elections Ontario faced 
with the task of creating and executing a 
referendum education campaign in a very 
short period of time, but they were also 
required to do so while preparing for a 
regularly scheduled provincial election on 
the same day. One of the concerns that arose 
during the Select Committee on Electoral 
Reform hearings regarding holding the 
referendum alongside the provincial 
election, rather than as a stand-alone 
referendum, was that political parties and 
voters would most likely focus on the 
general election campaigns, rather than the 
referendum. When discussing the 
referendum, Chief Electoral Officer John 
Hollins asked the committee members: 
“When people come to the poll in the next 
election, do you want them to be thinking 
about voting for you or voting about a 
referendum?” noting that the emphasis 
would most likely be placed on the 
provincial election campaigns, rather than 
the referendum (Ontario Legislature, 
2005b).  This challenge was magnified for 
Elections Ontario, which explains in its 
referendum report that,  
 
When Bill 218 was introduced, 
Elections Ontario was already 
ramping up to the final stages of 
event preparation for the first fixed-
date general election. Consequently, 
the available resources were fully 
deployed. Principal operational 
activities included the development 
and implementation of new technical 
and operating systems, implementing 
new electoral division boundaries for 
107 electoral districts, and training 
107 returning officers, 85 of them 
new. Staff was also committed to the 
normal pre-event activities related to 
electoral district and headquarters 
staffing, facility rental, supplies 
design and procurement, elector 
register updates, maps and the 
related logistics (2008: 5).  
 
Elections Ontario was faced with two large 
tasks, organizing and educating the public 
for an election and a referendum during the 
same time period. 
RROs likewise faced serious 
challenges because of the concurrent 
referendum and election. RROs were to have 
a desk, telephone and access to information 
technology at the Returning Office in their 





riding. Most noted that their riding’s 
Returning Officer attempted to comply with 
these requirements for RROs, but were 
simply too busy with the election campaign 
to make special accommodations. Some 
mentioned that finding physical space for 
RROs was difficult, since local Elections 
Ontario office space had already been rented 
and allocated before the Returning Officer 
was aware that RROs would also need 
access to the space. One RRO recalls having 
a corner by the kitchen to use.
18
 Another 
explained that halfway through the 
campaign her desk was taken up as storage 
space.
19
 However, the vast majority of 
RROs worked from their own home, some 
out of convenience, others because the space 
was simply not available at their Returning 
Office. Issues with telephone lines, fax 
machines and printers also arose, as the 
Returning Office predominately functioned 
as an election office. One RRO recalls,  
 
We were told that we would have an 
office with a phone and access to a 
photocopier and a fax machine... at 
the returning office. They didn’t 
bother to tell the returning officer 
that... Some returning officers were 
very welcoming and very 
supportive...but I know that some 
people had a lot of difficulty... most 
[Returning Officers] had already 
rented their space when we arrived 
on their doorsteps... in some places 
they literally had no physical space 
to give [RROs]... it was all blocked 
out and allocated before... they’d 
ever heard of us.
20
 
Five other RROs mentioned similar 




While it was required that space and 
equipment be used for both the referendum 
and election campaign, other requirements 
that the referendum and election remain 
separate caused confusion and difficulty 
among RROs and Returning Officers. While 
many Returning Offices were keen on 
forwarding questions about the referendum 
to their RRO, two of the interviewed RROs 
recall wanting to make presentations for the 
employees at their local Returning Offices, 
but trying to keep the referendum and 
election separate, the Returning Officer 
refused to allow them to do a presentation 
for the staff.
22
  Another RRO recounts that 
the office staff at the Returning Office were 
openly hostile to the referendum: “even the 
provincial Returning Officer gave me a hard 
time.  He and his assistant (elections clerk) 
felt that Elections Ontario hadn’t explained 
the referendum enough and they both 
proudly told me that they were going to 
leave their referendum ballots blank!”23 
Conducting the referendum and 
election at the same time not only caused 
problems for their own work, but many 
RROs also noted that it caused confusion 
and distraction for the public as well. As one 
RRO explained,  
With the referendum and the election 
being held at the same time... the 
referendum was overshadowed by 
the election, because that’s what 
people were interested in. If it had 
been separate, it would have cost 
more money of course, but it would 
have had more profile and... people 
would focus in on it and make 
themselves more aware of it.
24
  
Another RRO noted that  
In 2007, the funding of religious 
schools in Ontario appeared to 
dominate the political discourse and 
seemed to overshadow the debate 
over the referendum question. As a 
consequence, it was a challenge for 
any referendum resource officer to 
raise general awareness about the 





official referendum on the electoral 
system when the political parties 
were waging an informal referendum 
on the funding of religious schools.
25
  
Just as Ontario’s Chief Electoral Officer had 
forewarned, RROs felt that their message 
was overshadowed by the provincial 
election. 
The challenge of presenting a 
referendum education campaign at the same 
time as the provincial election campaign can 
be epitomized by many RROs’ experiences 
presenting about the referendum to the 
audiences at all-candidates debates. 
Originally, all-candidates debates were not 
included on the list of approved presentation 
locations. RROs were initially prohibited 
from presenting at “MPPs or candidate’s 
town hall meetings,” (Sutinen, 2007a) for 
fear that the referendum would become 
embroiled in the politics of the local election 
campaign. However, many RROs found that 
their best opportunities for large crowds and 
diverse audiences were these candidates’ 
meetings.
26
 Elections Ontario did end up 
allowing RROs to present at debates, but 
only if they spoke prior to the start of the 
debate. RROs noted that they were not 
usually allowed time for questions, and were 
required to leave before any debates got 
underway. Elections Ontario explained that 
this was necessary to ensure that RROs did 
not become a perceived ‘expert’ during an 
intense debate (2008: 23). Nevertheless, one 
RRO explained that she felt “lost in the 
shuffle” at all-candidates’ meetings.27 




Based on this feedback, election 
management bodies should consider holding 
referendums apart from a general election. 
Indeed, Canada’s federal Referendum Act 
stipulates that a referendum cannot be held 
concurrently with a general election 
(Parliament of Canada, 1992). Although 
holding the referendum during a general 
election costs less and could potentially 
increase voter turnout, in the Ontario case 
many RROs noted that elections issues 
overshadowed the electoral reform question. 
A referendum separate from a general 
election may also encourage political parties 
to become more involved in the campaign, 
as their attention and finances are not 
concentrated on re-election.  
 Elections Ontario also faced the 
pressure of managing an election and 
referendum at the same time and, as such, 
limited time and resources were available 
for staff to oversee referendum projects. The 
RRO program, for example, was overseen 
by one contract staff member, who managed 
the activities of all 106 part-time RROs.
29
 
Delegating the public education campaign to 
an independent body separate from the 
regular elections administrator could 
alleviate stress on election management 
bodies when there is a concurrent general 
election. This was done in New Zealand 
where an Independent Electoral Referendum 
Panel was formed to administrate the 
referendum’s public education campaign 
and was led by five prominent public 
servants and academics, whose sole 
responsibility was referendum education 




All of the RROs interviewed 
commented on the materials they were 
provided with in order to fulfill their duties. 
Each RRO was provided with brochures, 
posters and a presentation on DVD, 
PowerPoint, overhead transparencies and a 
35mm slide deck. This material was 
developed by the public relations firm Grey 
Worldwide, with the advice of academics 
and input of focus groups (Elections 
Ontario, 2008: 11, 23). Because of the 
timeline restrictions, the materials were not 
all ready for the launch of the campaign at 





the end of August. RROs remember being 
sent copies of the presentation that were still 
being updated, even after they had made 
presentations. One RRO called this a 
problem of materials being “half-baked” 
before they were sent out to RROs.
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Another RRO recalls having scheduled a 
presentation at a local church for the end of 
August. Without a full set of materials, he 
was nervous about presenting, until the 
slides arrived an hour before his 
presentation.
31
 This problem was especially 
tough for those making presentations in 
French. The finalized script and slides for 
the French presentation only arrived in 
RROs email inboxes on September 11, 
2007, less than a month before the 
referendum date (Sutinen, 2007b).  
The final version of the presentation 
provided by Elections Ontario, that the 
RROs were instructed not to deviate from to 
remove any potential bias, was another 
cause of frustration. The presentation 
featured text-heavy slides, with few 
diagrams or animation. One RRO mentioned 
that the “the PowerPoint presentation was a 
series of static slides... it seemed to me that 
whoever did the PowerPoint didn’t 
understand the capability of PowerPoint.”32 
Many RROs suggested the need for graphics 
and animation to make the difficult material 




Similarly, many RROs found their 
audiences confused by the brochures that 
were distributed both in their mailboxes and 
at the presentations.
34
 One RRO explained 
that “Everyone - homeless to bankers to 
grade-school to PhD - complained about 
brochures.”35 Another mentioned,  
 
The layout of the posters and the 
pamphlets was text-heavy with 
technical information that seemed 
designed for an audience of 
university-educated political science 
scholars. Citizens with little or no 
understanding of Ontario’s electoral 
system remarked that the posters and 
pamphlets seemed to resemble a 
credit card agreement. 
36
  
He recalls members of the audience 
complaining that the brochure was not easy 
to understand. 
Pedagogical problems were among 
the most common complaints among RROs 
about the materials with which they were 
provided. Elections Ontario was aware of 
the potential for this problem and had the 
materials reviewed by a literacy consultant, 
who originally evaluated the materials to be 
at a grade 12 reading level. Elections 
Ontario’s Referendum Report explains that  
 
They attempted a rewrite that 
reduced the materials to a Grade 6.5 
reading level, however, in 
simplifying the language, some of 
the concepts became inaccurate, 
confused or unclear. The consultant 
acknowledged that, even after the 
rewrite to simplify the language, the 
intellectual content of the MMP 
materials was at least at a Grade 9 
(2008: 12). 
Many RROs found this high level of literacy 
prevented them from using the tools 
effectively.
37
  One RRO, a retired teacher, 
commented that the materials 
“pedagogically weren’t designed by 
educators.”38  As a solution to this common 
problem, RROs suggested that there needed 
to be a variety of materials for different 
literacy levels. One RRO described the time 
he presented to a group of developmentally 
disabled voters and became frustrated with 




Another RRO suggested that five or six 
tools be available for different levels of 
election literacy, in a minimum of English 









Some RROs were able to adapt their 
presentations to the needs of different 
language communities and audiences. 
However, with such a short timeframe for 
education, the process of translating or 
adapting material and having it approved cut 
into the RROs’ allotted hours and was not 
always feasible. Based on the feedback of 
these RROS, high-quality materials should 
be created for audiences without internet 
accesses,
41
 for children and youth, and in 
varying reading levels. Educational tools 
with language more accessible for those 
whose first language is not English or 
French was also suggested, whether in a 
broader range of languages, or at a more 




RROs also wished they had been 
provided with budgets to rent audio-visual 
technology, book halls, advertise for 
presentations and spend more hours working 
in their riding. In particular, access to the 
technology necessary to use the materials 
provided was a common complaint among 
RROs.
42
 Since they were not provided 
computers or projectors, RROs could 
frequently not use electronic media unless 
the venue had that technology already 
available. In the words of three different 
RROs, they had to “beg and borrow”43 the 
equipment necessary to make their 
presentations. One RRO recalls having to 
borrow an overhead projector from a local 
school: “I prayed that the bulb wouldn't burn 
out, it is expensive to replace. I did give a 
new bulb to the school (money out of my 
pocket) when I returned the projector.”44  
Another RRO recalls,  
 
I felt that I needed the PowerPoint 
the most as many of my 
presentations were to large groups. 
The maddening thing was that I was 
not given a laptop and an external 
projector. The response was that the 
service group would have this 
available which is not the case as we 
live in a rural area and access even to 
rentals was not doable. I rented a 
laptop on my own and begged and 
borrowed a projector for the 
presentations. This was stressful and 
time consuming. The overhead 
transparencies were not useful in that 
I was not provided with an overhead 
projector. I was told to borrow one 
from a local school. The local 
schools did have them but they were 
all welded on to permanent stands 
and were not portable... At the time, I 
did not own a small tv and dvd 




RROs also wished they had been given 
budgets to rent equipment, book halls and 
meeting rooms and advertise upcoming 
presentations. One RRO explains that “It 
was quite clear that we had to... figure out 
how best to “reach” all the electors in our 
riding without any budget!  There was no 
money to rent halls, run ads or print 
flyers.”46 Some desired to reach those not 
involved in service groups, clubs or 
residences and could not do so without a 
larger budget to set up their own public 
meetings on the referendum question.  
For some RROs, there was also a 
discrepancy between the billable hours 
allotted and the hours required to complete 
the job.
47
 Although a few weeks into the 
campaign RROs were budgeted 50% more 
hours, some found that they were met with 
backlash for performing more than a part-
time job (Elections Ontario, 2008: 31). One 
RRO explains that she met the greatest 
number people when she convinced local 
organizers to allow her to set up a booth at a 





rural fair. This forum allowed her to speak to 
a diverse group of people and individually 
answer questions about the referendum for 
them. However, she was criticized by 
Elections Ontario for working too many 
hours. She explains:  
 
I only took bathroom breaks and I 
worked all the hours I was there and 
I remember Elections Ontario didn’t 
pay me for all my time.  They 
couldn’t believe I worked that many 
hours and spoke to that many people.  
I spoke to hundreds of people each 
day as I didn’t sit down on a chair 
waiting for people to talk to me.
48
  
Another RRO recounts a similar situation: 
“A lot of people… ended up working 
essentially for free for a whole lot of time… 
we were never told a maximum number, but 
then when you put in your weekly hours at 
some point people were told...that [they] 
couldn’t work that many hours a week.”49 
Similar stories were reported by six other 
RROs, who explained that, in order to track 
down and make presentations for all 
interested groups, the program should have 
had additional RROs or should have hired 




Working only part-time, the RROs 
were unable to reach the percentage of the 
population they desired. RROs with 
geographically larger electoral districts also 
noted that this problem was compounded by 
having to drive across their ridings, which 
would take up a significant amount of their 
time.
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 One RRO explains that Elections 
Ontario was “caught… off guard. There 
were a lot of places that really... wanted this 
information so if they could have doubled 
the amount of print and doubled the amount 
of hours we worked, we still wouldn’t have 





Despite these limited materials and 
budgets, RROs scheduled their time to make 
presentations about electoral reform to their 
local populations. However, maintaining 
impartiality while also providing useful 
information and sparking local discussion 
was a challenge. Elections Ontario was 
faced with the nearly insurmountable task of 
presenting an alternative electoral system 
without appearing to endorse it. During their 
RRO training, impartiality and neutrality 
was emphasized (Elections Ontario, 2007b). 
The RROs recall being provided with a strict 
script from which they were instructed not to 
deviate. RROs were described by Elections 
Ontario as “providers of, and conduits for 
scripted general referendum information” 
(2008: 22). This proved to be a difficult rule 
to follow for many RROs who wished to 
adapt the presentation for their audiences. 
One RRO noted, “When you’re singing from 
the songbook, you can’t truly explain it.”53 
She explained that the best educators need to 
interact with their audience and answer 
questions with different wording and 
examples. However, many RROs felt they 
did not have the freedom to do this. Without 
the opportunity to hear a full explanation 
from RROs, participants would turn to 
others in the audience to explain it to them.  
RROs found this to be a major problem, 
because when other audience members were 
left with the responsibility of explaining 
those unanswered questions, the neutrality 
of the information was corrupted.
54
 
Although the RROs understood that 
Elections Ontario wanted the material to 
remain consistent, some found this strict 
script to be a detriment to the end goal of the 
campaign to educate people neutrally.  
 This problem was exacerbated when 
it came time for question and answer 
periods. RROs were provided with a list of 
frequently asked questions with answers, 





and were told not to answer other questions 
but to direct participants to the website or an 
information hotline number set up for the 
referendum and election. However, this 
remained unsatisfactory for some 
participants, which put RROs in 
uncomfortable situations, especially since 
their role was specifically designed to 
provide a local person, rather than an 
anonymous phone number or website, with 
whom electors could discuss the referendum 
(Elections Ontario, 2008: 24). For example, 
one RRO explained that some audience 
members “were angry with me because they 
had questions and I was telling them to call 
an 800-number... and they know you know, 
they know you have the answer to their 
question but you’re not giving it to them.”55 
She also remembers some participants who 
specifically came to the presentation because 
they were unsatisfied with the explanation 
from the information hotline and were 
disappointed when the RRO had the exact 
same scripted answer to the question.
56
 To 
other questions without scripted answers, 
RROs had the uncomfortable position of 
having to answer that “we haven’t 
developed a response to that particular 
question yet” 57 and hope the answer would 
become available before the referendum. 
One RRO felt that “all they trained us to do 
was to give information, sequentially, on a 
very superficial level.”58 Another recalls 
being told during training, “You’re paid to 
do; you’re not paid to think.”59 RROs felt 
they were unable to explain answers to 
common questions in their own words and 
with language that would best suit their 
audiences. 
For example, one of the most 
common complaints that RROs received was 
that they were unable to fully answer the 
question “What will it cost?”60 By 
September 11, Elections Ontario had 
formulated an answer:  
 
If the referendum results in a vote in 
favour of Mixed Member 
Proportional, by December 31st, 
2008, the new government would 
have to introduce a law to make 
Mixed Member Proportional 
Ontario's new system.  When the law 
is introduced and considered by the 
legislature, electors will be able to 
ask questions and debate the costs of 
the new system. The precise cost of 
the new system would depend on the 
details of the law and is a question 
that will have to be asked of the 
future government (Sutinen, 2007b).  
For some RROs, this response amounted to 
the same answer as before: we don’t know. 
Another common question was what 
formula would be used to allocate seats in 
the new MMP system. Again, RROs could 
not provide an answer or any examples of 
what it would look like with the exact seat 
calculations.
61
 Northern RROs were often 
faced with the question of how it would 
affect their region.
62
 Once again, the 
materials with which they were provided did 
not answer the question. Faced with the tight 
restrictions from Elections Ontario, RROs 
were unable to satisfyingly answer these and 
similar questions. One RRO explains the 
common response they received when 
unable to answer these questions was, “How 
can we vote and approve... something that 
you don’t know?”63 Another found that 
“[Elections Ontario] really wouldn’t allow 
us to be totally informative... they didn’t 
want to really take the discussion to the 
ultimate conclusion. It seemed to me that it’s 
being dishonest... don’t try and pretend that 
you’re giving people the full story when 
you’re not.”64 Answering questions from a 
script was therefore a challenging direction 
for some RROs to follow.  
Because of these directions, many 
RROs felt “handcuffed”65 when making 
presentations. One RRO explained that 





“there were some people that had it in their 
head that ‘change is bad.’ They didn’t know 
why they didn’t want it to change, but they 
just didn’t want it to change.  That was the 
hardest one to walk away from and not 
challenge them. You couldn’t do that...”66 
Thus, in attempting to remain impartial, 
RROs were unable to encourage their 
audiences to consider alternative points of 
view, which many felt should be the aim of 
education campaigns.
67
 Debates and 
discussion could not occur while the RRO 
was present, making the presentations a 
method of disseminating static information, 
rather than encouraging critical thinking 
about electoral systems. One RRO 
concluded that the campaign was “so fair 
that it curtailed a lively discussion.”68 
 Indeed, some RROs and their 
audiences wished they could have been 
provided with some sense of the advantages 
and disadvantages about the current and 
proposed systems. As one RRO explained, 
“If you don’t see the problem, you’re not 
interested in the solution.”69 RROs felt they 
needed to encourage voters to not only know 
the mechanics of voting systems but also to 
form an opinion. Although the presentation 
did present criteria to consider, it did not 
assist voters in making the connections 
between the criteria and the two proposed 
voting systems (Elections Ontario, 2007c).  
Perhaps Elections Ontario had anticipated 
that interest groups would fill up this space, 
as they were “in full expectation that, as in 
New Zealand and British Columbia, the 
proponents of each of the two choices in the 
question would complement the process 
with fulsome public discussion and debate 
about the perceived merits of each electoral 
system” (Elections Ontario, 2008: 7). 
However, only ten groups registered to take 
part in referendum campaigning, spending a 
combined total of only $495 942.86 
(Elections Ontario, 2007a). Thus, RROs felt 
they had to compensate for this lack of 
public debate, but were prevented from 
encouraging or even being in the room when 
there was discussion of the merits and 
demerits of the proposed electoral system. 
Likewise, the two major political parties and 
numerous candidates chose not to enter into 
the public debate on electoral reform during 
the 2007 provincial election.  
RROs hoped they could provide 
information to enough voters that their 
campaign could fill a part of this void. 
Unfortunately though, many RROs found 
that the audience reached was not as diverse 
as they had anticipated. They were 
instructed to give presentations at meetings 
of a number of different community 
associations and the most common 
audiences were service groups, who, many 
RROs noted, were already aware of and 
interested in the referendum.
70
 The other 
group that was commonly presented to were 
seniors who attended presentations at their 
residences. Thus, some RROs admitted that 
they most often reached “overwhelmingly 
middle-aged and senior”71 members of the 
public or those who already “paid attention 
to political matters.”72 Because their 
presentations were to specific interest or 
service groups, and very rarely open to the 
public, some RROs found it difficult to 
speak to the “general public, “73 or “people 
who worked for a living.”74 The final 
Elections Ontario Report records that 
338,298 people were reached through the 
efforts of RROs, which includes both 
presentations and the estimated audience of 
media reports in which RROs were cited.
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This amounts to less than 3% of the 
population.  
It is necessary to reconsider whether 
an effective referendum information 
campaign needs to include more than simply 
the neutral information Elections Ontario 
provided. There are a variety of ways to do 
this. In 2009, British Columbia opted to 
fund Yes and No campaigns in order to 





supplement their education programs with 
groups that could debate the advantages and 
drawback of each system, though it is nearly 
impossible to regulate the quality of 
independent campaigns (Elections BC, 
2009a: 39). A similar, but more manageable, 
solution could be to equip RROs with 
information to share with their audiences 
about potential ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of the 
proposed electoral system. While not 
engaging in debate themselves, RROs could 
also be trained to moderate debates amongst 
their audiences regarding the proposals, 
rather than be required to exit before any 
debate occurs. In this way, RROs could be 
prepared to maintain neutrality whilst 
encouraging the public to form opinions. 
This is parallel to the reflections presented in 
Election Ontario’s final report on the 
referendum:  “Looking ahead, a broader role 
as a facilitator of debates could offer electors 
opportunities to satisfy their inquisitiveness 
to explore the details of the systems under 
consideration, in locally organized, balanced 
discussion forums, while preserving 




Elections Ontario’s unique 
Referendum Resource Officer program, 
while comprising only a small part of their 
total Provincial Referendum Education 
Program (PREP) budget, provided a local 
neutral voice for the issue of electoral 
reform in communities across Ontario.
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RROs sought to provide the necessary 
information for electors to “understand the 
question” (Elections Ontario, 2008: 12) that 
they would be presented with in the on 
October 10
th
 referendum. However, they 
faced a short lead-time, limited materials 
and budgets, and scripted presentations. 
Their on-the-ground experiences echo the 
survey research and media commentary that 
suggests Ontarians were not equipped with 
the appropriate information to make a 
competent decision on the MMP proposal. 
This echoes the academic literature 
that suggests that voters require information 
that will lead to decision-making shortcuts, 
rather than purely technical data (LeDuc, 
2003: 174; Popkin, 1991). Without vocal 
activist groups, active political parties or any 
other cues on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the referendum, RROs 
attempted to fill an information void. But 
they were limited as to the discussion they 
could foster because of their promise of 
impartiality, causing frustration for both 
RROs and voters. They were often unable to 
help voters make the connections needed to 
form opinions.    
This case study also supports the 
theory that referendums results will be 
skewed to the status quo when there is a 
barrier to voters’ access of useful 
information. Some RROs felt that, since 
they were prohibited from giving 
information for or against the referendum, 
their audiences could not properly consider 
voting for MMP. This suggests that public 
education needed to move beyond notifying 
the public that they have a “big decision” 
(Elections Ontario, 2008: 12) to make, but 
instead encouraging the genuine debate and 
discussion needed to make that decision. 
Finally, the feedback of RROs 
broadly supports the criticism of the Ontario 
government’s conduct during the 
referendum campaign. LeDuc, for example, 
writes that “having created the Assembly, 
the Ontario government essentially 
abandoned and isolated it” (2011: 564). He 
explains that the decisions of the provincial 
government, whether on the issue of 
requiring a supermajority for the referendum 
to pass, or the referendum’s timeline, 
directed the referendum towards failure. 
This reiterates the common frustration of 
some RROs that the provincial government 
had doomed the referendum to failure. One 





RRO mentioned that “it is clear to me that 
MMP was set up to fail.  A promise had 
been made by the Liberal government and it 
had been fulfilled, but the process 
(especially the timing) that was used, 
assured the outcome the government 
desired.”77 This sentiment supports the 
academic opinion that the failure of electoral 
reform in Ontario lies, at least partially, with 
a lack of political will in Ontario’s Liberal 
government.  
In sum, the experiences of local 
RROs reflects the public and academic 
concern that the 2007 Ontario referendum 
on electoral reform was crippled by a 
government reluctant to give it a fair chance 
at success and a public that was not 
equipped with the competence to make such 
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Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 2. 
Email interview with author. June 24, 2011. 
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 3. 
Email interview with author. June 24, 2011. 
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 4. 
Email interview with author. June 9, 2011. 
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 5. 
Email interview with author. June 17, 2011. 
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 6. 
Telephone interview with author. June 12, 2011.  
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 7. 
Telephone interview with author. June 13, 2011. 
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 8. 
Telephone interview with author. June 15, 2011.  
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 9. 
Telephone interview with author. June 15, 2011.  
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10. Telephone interview with author. June 17, 
2011.  
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
11. Telephone interview with author. June 22, 
2011.  
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
12. Telephone interview with author. June 22, 
2011.  
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
13. Telephone interview with author. June 26, 
2011.  
 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
14. Telephone interview with author. June 28, 
2011.  
 
Balaban, Anne. Telephone interview with author. 
June 15, 2011. (Willowdale) 
Fairbain, Marty. Telephone interview with author. 
June 27, 2011. (Guelph) 
Fraser, Robert. Telephone interview with author. 
June 15, 2011. (Nipissing) 
Ganley, Rosemary. Telephone interview with author. 
June 13, 2011. (Peterborough) 
Holloway, Kevin. Telephone interview with author. 
June 13, 2011. (Thunder Bay - Superior North) 
Hudson, Keith. Telephone interview with author. 
June 24, 2011. (Oxford) 
McIntyre, George. Telephone interview with author. 
June 13, 2011. (London North Centre) 
Metcalfe, Richard. Telephone interview with author. 
June 20, 2011. (Sault Ste. Marie) 
Moore, David. Telephone interview with author. June 
15, 2011. (Parry Sound – Muskoka) 
Mulligan, Sean. Telephone interview with author. 
June 16, 2011. (Markham – Unionville) 
Navickas, Adam. Email interview with author. June 
13, 2011. (Beaches - East York) 
Patel, Abdul Hai. Telephone interview with author. 
June 17, 2011. (Scarborough – Southwest) 
Patterson, David. Email interview with author. June 
9, 2011. (Prince Edward – Hastings) 
Purvis, Jan. Telephone interview with author. June 
15, 2011. (Kitchener – Waterloo) 
Sanchuk, Karen. Email interview with author. June 
23, 2011. (Chatham - Kent – Essex)  
Wood, William. Telephone interview with author. 
June 17, 2011. (Stormont - Dundas - South 
Glengarry) 
 
                                                          
1
 In the last week before the election, a Strategic 
Council poll reported that 76% of electors knew 
about the proposed changes (Howlett, 2007). The 
question asked whether respondents knew “a lot,” “a 
little” or “nothing at all” about the proposed new 
electoral system. 76% of respondents answered “a 
lot” or “a little.” Elections Ontario’s post-election 
survey reported that of the 83% of electors aware of 
the referendum, 76% felt they were very or somewhat 





                                                                                       
knowledgeable about the referendum question 
(Elections Ontario, 2008: 34). It is important to note 
that this poll, like the one done by the Strategic 
Council asked respondents for a self-assessment of 
how knowledgeable they were about the referendum.  
2
 The 2007 Ontario Referendum on Electoral Reform 
is a good example of a referendum not clearly 
dividing voters along party lines. The governing 
Liberal Party had prominent candidates who spoke 
out in favour and against the referendum proposal.  
3
 Their finding is echoed by Cutler and Fournier, 
2007.  
4
 Louis Massicotte suggests that there have been three 
waves of calls electoral reform in Canada. For 
historical examples of electoral reform discussions in 
Canada, see Massicotte, 2008 or Pilon, 2007. See also 
the Law Commission of Canada’s report Voting 
Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada (2004).  
5
 For more in the Citizen’s Assembly process, 
particularly in British Columbia, see Warren and 




 Of the total $7 895 000 final budget for the 
Referendum Education Project, $3 741 000 was spent 
on traditional advertising (radio, TV and Print). 
8
 Although it was intended that each of the 107 
provincial ridings would have one RRO, the riding of 
Hamilton Centre did not have an RRO as of the 
launch of the writ.
8
 Consequently, the riding was 
covered by two neighbouring RROs (Anonymous 
Former Referendum Resource Officer 6, email 
interview by author, June 12, 2011.) 
9
 When interviewed, RROs were asked to place 
themselves into one of three age groups (18-29 
30-49, and 50+). Of those who volunteered their 
exact age, the youngest was 25 and the oldest was 70. 
However, only 6 of the RROs interviewed 
categorized themselves as younger than 50.  
10
 Abdul Hai Patel, telephone interview with author, 
June 17, 2011; Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 10, telephone interview with author, 
June 17, 2011;Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 11, telephone interview with author, 
June 22, 2011; Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 13, telephone interview with author, 
June 26, 2011; Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 2, email interview with author, June 
24, 2011; Anonymous Former Referendum Resource 
Officer 3, email interview with author, June 24, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 4, 
email interview with author, June 9, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 5, 
email interview with author, June 17, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 7, 
                                                                                       
telephone interview with author, June 13, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 9, 
telephone interview with author, June 15, 2011; 
David Moore, telephone interview by author, June 
15, 2011; David Patterson, email interview with 
author, June 9, 2011; George McIntyre, telephone 
interview with author, June 13, 2011; Jan Purvis, 
telephone interview with author, June 15, 2011; 
Karen Sanchuck, email interview by author, June 23, 
2011;  Keith Hudson, telephone interview with 
author, June 24, 2011; Kevin Holloway, telephone 
interview with author, June 13, 2011; Marty 
Fairbairn, telephone interview with author, June 27, 
2011; Richard Metcalfe, telephone interview with 
author, June 20, 2011; Robert Fraser, telephone 
interview by author, June 15, 2011; Rosemary 
Ganley, telephone interview with author, June 13, 
2011; Sean Mulligan, telephone interview with 
author, June 16, 2011. 
11
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
11, telephone interview with author, June 22, 2011. 
12
 Sean Mulligan, telephone interview with author, 
June 16, 2011. 
13
 Karen Sanchuck, email interview by author, June 
23, 2011. 
14
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011; 
Jan Purvis, telephone interview with author, June 15, 
2011; Rosemary Ganley, telephone interview with 
author, June 13, 2011. 
15
 Full list of approved presentation locations: 
“Community Service Clubs and Groups, 
Schools/School Boards, Community Centres, 
Recreation/Sports Teams, Tourism Boards, Nursing 
Homes, Seniors Residences, Municipal Councils and 
City Hall, Fitness Centres (drop off info), Day Care 
Centres (drop off info), Libraries, Churches – Places 
of Worship, Community Festivals and Fairs, 
Neighbourhood Associations and RatePayers 
Associations. DO NOT agree to present at MPPs or 
candidate’s town hall meetings” (Sutinen, 2007a). 
16
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
13, telephone interview with author, June 26, 2011. 
17
 Karen Sanchuck, email interview by author, June 
23, 2011. 
18
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011. 
19
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
5, email interview with author, June 17, 2011. 
20
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011. 
21
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
3, email interview with author, June 24, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 4, 





                                                                                       
email interview with author, June 9, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 8, 
telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 9, 
telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011; 
Karen Sanchuck, email interview by author, June 23, 
2011.  
22
 Karen Sanchuck, email interview by author, June 
23, 2011; Anonymous Referendum Resource Officer 
5, email interview with author, June 17, 2011.  
23
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
4, email interview with author, June 9, 2011. 
24
 Richard Metcalfe, telephone interview with author, 
June 20, 2011. 
25
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
2, email interview by author, June 24, 2011.  
26
 For example, Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 10, telephone interview with author, 
June 17, 2011; Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 13, telephone interview with author, 
June 26, 2011;  
27
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
5, email interview with author, June 17, 2011. 
28
 David Moore, telephone interview by author, June 
15, 2011. 
29
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
3, email interview by author, June 24, 2011. 
30
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
7, telephone interview with author, June 13, 2011. 
31
 Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011. 
32
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
11, telephone interview with author, June 22, 2011. 
33
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
2, email interview with author, June 24, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 5, 
email interview with author, June 17, 2011. 
34
 Two brochures were distributed as householders 
(one near the beginning of the campaign and one at 
the end of the campaign) and one was given to RROs 
to hand out. One RRO noted that all three looked 
remarkably similar. (Anonymous Former 
Referendum Resource Officer 5, email interview with 
author, June 17, 2011). 
35
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
3, email interview with author, June 24, 2011, 
36
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
2, email interview with author, June 24, 2011. 
37
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
3, email interview with author, June 24, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011; 
Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
                                                                                       
June 13, 2011; Rosemary Ganley, telephone 
interview with author, June 13, 2011.  
38
 Rosemary Ganley, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011.  
39
Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011. 
40
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011. 
41
 RROs noted that many of the additional resources 
were only available online.  
42
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
1, email interview with author, June 14, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
11, telephone interview with author, June 22, 2011;  
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
13, telephone interview with author, June 26, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 2, 
email interview with author, June 24, 2011;  
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 4, 
email interview with author, June 9, 2011;  
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 5, 
email interview with author, June 17, 2011;  
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 7, 
telephone interview with author, June 13, 2011;  
Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011;  Richard Metcalfe, telephone 
interview with author, June 20, 2011; Robert Fraser, 
telephone interview by author, June 15, 2011; 
William Wood, telephone interview with author, June 
17, 2011. 
43
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
4, email interview with author, June 9, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 5, 
email interview with author, June 17, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
11, telephone interview with author, June 22, 2011.  
44
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
1, email interview with author, June 14, 2011. 
45
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
5, email interview with author, June 17, 2011 
46
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
4, email interview with author, June 9, 2011 
47
 RROs explained that they were not provided with a 
set number of hours. Instead, they were instructed 
simply to submit any hours they worked. Some RROs 
found that they received backlash for working too 
many hours. For example, Anonymous Former 
Referendum Resource Officer 4, email interview with 
author, June 9, 2011; Anonymous Former 
Referendum Resource Officer 7, telephone interview 
with author, June 13, 2011; Anonymous Former 
Referendum Resource Officer 10, telephone 
interview with author, June 17, 2011.  





                                                                                       
48
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
4, email interview with author, June 9, 2011. 
49
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011. 
50
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
7, telephone interview with author, June 13, 2011;  
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 6, 
telephone interview with author, June 12, 2011;  
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
14, telephone interview with author, June 28, 2011;  
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 8, 
telephone interview with author, June 15, 2011; 
Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011; George McIntyre, telephone interview 
with author, June 13, 2011.  
51
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
4, email interview with author, June 9, 2011; 
Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
14, telephone interview with author, June 28, 2011; 
Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011. 
52
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
8, telephone interview with author, June 15, 2011. 
53





 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer, 






 David Moore, telephone interview by author, June 
15, 2011. 
59
 Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011. 
60
 For example, Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 10, telephone interview with author, 
June 17, 2011; Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 12, telephone interview with author, 
June 22, 2011. 
61
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview with author, June 17, 2011 
                                                                                       
62
 Kevin Holloway, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011; Richard Metcalfe, telephone interview 
with author, June 20, 2011. 
63
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
11, telephone interview with author, June 22, 2011. 
64
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
7, telephone interview with author, June 13, 2011.  
65
 Rosemary Ganley, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011. 
66
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
8, telephone interview with author, June 15, 2011. 
67
 For example, one RRO mentioned, “the goal of 
education is to replace an empty mind with an open 
mind.” (Anonymous Former Referendum Resource 
Officer 7, telephone interview with author, June 13, 
2011). 
68
 Rosemary Ganley, telephone interview with author, 
June 13, 2011. 
69
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
10, telephone interview by author, June 17, 2011. 
70
 Adam Navickas, telephone interview by author, 
June 13, 2011; Anonymous Former Referendum 
Resource Officer 8, email interview by author, June 
15, 2011.  
71
 Karen Sanchuck, email interview by author, June 
23, 2011. 
72
 Robert Fraser, telephone interview by author, June 
15, 2011. 
73
 David Moore, telephone interview by author, June 
15, 2011. 
74
 Anonymous Former Referendum Resource Officer 
3, email interview by author, June 24, 2011.  
75
 In the RRO final reports I was permitted to read by 
some of the RROs, the total numbers of individuals 
reached included estimated readers of news stories 
they were featured in.  
76
 Of the total $7 895 000 spent on the referendum, 
the RRO program only cost $580 000 or roughly 7% 
of the total budget (Elections Ontario, 2008: 7). 
77
 Karen Sanchuck, email interview by author, June 
23, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
